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Abstract
In this paper, we draw upon the bank survival literature and that in the information
management area in identifying the key factors behind the survival of Chinese online P2P
lending platforms. In particular, we are interested in determining whether the traditional
financial capital or the social capital, associated with the online nature of these innovative
lending platforms, plays a more essential role. We implement a flexible proportional odds
model with a baseline spline function to analyze survival patterns and also consider potential
fractional polynomial transformation and time-dependent effect of variables. Using a
hand-collected dataset of 6190 platforms from June 2007 to June 2017, we provide robust
evidence that although financial capital variables play an important role in driving platform
survival, they are less significant or become insignificance in the presence of social capital
variables. These findings contribute to both the literature and the development of this
innovative and fast-growing industry of financial inclusion.

Keywords
Social Network; Online Reviews; Proportional Odds Model; Cubic Polynomials.

1. Introduction
During the Great Default between June 2007 to June 2017, 61% (or 3766) of 6190 online
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms in China has defaulted. By end of June 2017, half a
million investors have suffered from defaulted loans with an estimate loss of 4.39 billion
USD.i The large number of default has triggered public outcries for more financial capital
requirement including increased registered capital, compulsory insurance plan, setting up
reserve fund, and so forth, suggested by the main findings in the banking literature, especially
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the strand on bank survival (Calomiris & Mason, 2003), as the P2P lending platform is
considered a form of financial intermediary (Datta & Chatterjee, 2008).
Meanwhile, the online nature of P2P platforms indicates such research crosses over to the
literature of e-commerce and information system, which is one of the contributions this paper
makes. Electronic financial service agents behave as financial intermediaries by assisting and
providing sources of trust in online transactions (Datta & Chatterjee, 2008). An important
concept related to default in the e-commerce and information system field is trustworthiness.
The lack of trust is shown to be the greatest barrier to online transactions (Kim et al., 2004).
Companies that successfully build trust are able to better connect with customers and other
economic players, and achieve better chance for survival (Hoffman et al., 1999; Karimov et
al., 2011). So what is trust? How can we evaluate it? According to the social capital theory,
trust is interconnected with social capital: social capital is not only a generator of trust
(Putnam et al., 1994), but also a motivational result of trust (Adler & Kwon, 2002). An
organization with higher level of social capital is able to generate higher level of trust, which
in turn accumulate more social capital (Lins et al., 2017). The same theory carries over to the
online P2P lending industry.
Given the different theories and focuses on survival in the banking literature versus the
e-commerce literature, we raise two research questions: First, for the online P2P lending
industry, are financial capital and social capital both significant factors for survival? If they
are, is one type of capital more essential than the other? Answers to these questions are
relevant to investors, regulators, and platform managers, and substantively advance our
understanding of this new form of financial innovation. For P2P investors, a healthy and
viable P2P lending industry helps mitigate or avoid financial losses. For regulators, the ability
to identify major risk factors allows them to put forth more relevant and effective policy and
reduce specific or regional financial risk. For online P2P platform managers, our findings will
enable them to learn from the history and improve their chance for survival.
As far as we are aware, our study is the first that examines P2P lending platform default in
the wider crowdfunding industry. Hence we fill a gap in the crowdfunding literature that so
far focuses mainly on the market economic mechanism or behaviour of market participants
(e.g., Mollick, 2014; Zhang & Liu, 2012). Methodologically, we extend the economics and
e-commerce literature which predominantly adopts the Cox (1972) model (e.g., Wang et al.,
2013; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000) by constructing a flexible proportional odds model with a
baseline spline function. The model is able to not only identify influential variables to a
platform’s survival but also predict with accuracy future survival pattern. Fractional
polynomial transformation is also considered to uncover potential nonlinearity in variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our econometric model.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Econometric framework
2.1. Parametric model construction
Originated from biostatistics, survival analysis is applied widely to analyze firm survival.
Following Royston and Parmar (2002), we use a flexible parametric survival model with
cubic splines, to address the disadvantages of the popular Cox (1972) model, which is
criticized for constant hazard ratio and not being able to predict survival time, hazard rates, or
absolute risk (Orth, 2013). Furthermore, we choose the flexible proportional odds (PO) model
since it generalizes the baseline survival function to avoid poor fit and over fit, respectively,
of standard parametric models and the Cox models (Gelfand et al., 2000). Also, it assumes
that hazard ratios converge to one if

(Bennett, 1983), which is consistent with our

dataset. In our application, the log odds that failure events will occur in the interval
can be written as follows:

where

stands for the covariate matrix and Fin, Soc, and Control are covariate matrices for

financial capital, social capital and control variables respectively. Define the baseline
distribution function

Our survival curves

, we have the PO model as follows:

and

are expressed as follows:

Following Bouvatier and Delatte (2015) and Royston and Parmar (2002), the baseline
function is a restricted cubic spline function, which exhibits less restrictions on the functional
form and mitigates misspecification problem (see Harrell (2001)). A restricted cubic splines
function is a smoothed piecewise cubic polynomials function restricted to be linear beyond
the two boundary knots, kmin and kmax, the minimum and maximum of uncensored survival
times of platforms. The restricted cubic spline function
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with m interior knots,

kmin<k1<…<km< kmax, and two boundary knots, kmin and kmax, can be written as
of which,
, and

for

for j=1,…,m. And the “+” function is defined as

, and

.

The baseline spline function parameters are orthogonalized to be uncorrelated with each other,
have mean zero and unit standard deviation to improve their numerical stability. For the
flexible PO(d) model, d is the degree of freedom (d.f.) corresponding to d-1 interior knots.
The number of knots can be determined via the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the
Bayes information criterion (BIC) to avoid underfitting or overfitting and the interior knots
are evenly placed at every 100/d percentiles as suggested by Royston and Parmar (2002).
In the defaults strand of the literature, time-dependent effect of covariates are usually
considered (Gupta et al., 2017). The time-dependent effect is captured by the interaction
between the covariate and the spline variables as follows:

where D is the number of time-dependent effect variables,
the spline function of time-dependent effect variable,

is the parameter estimates of
is the time-dependent effect

variable. We constrain knots number and placements to those of the baseline spline function.
2.2. Nonlinear transformation of variables
There is widespread interest in considering potential nonlinearity transformation of variables
in the literature (Nikolaeva et al., 2015), since nonlinearity can more precisely model the
variables and better discover the phenomena/theory (Nikolaeva et al., 2015). But rather than
use logarithmic or quadratic functions with predefined shapes, we use fractional polynomial
(FP) function with flexible shapes following Royston and Sauerbrei (2008) and Sauerbrei and
Royston (1999). In specific, for a given variable x, the nonlinear relationship can be modeled
by a fractional polynomial function with m degree and powers pm as follows:
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The set of powers

is

For a 2 degree FP where

and
,

is the natural logarithm.
. In our PO model we use the

FP with one power term, FP(1). The decision of FP transformation depends on whether it
decreases the deviance (minus two maximized log likelihood), and the degree of power term
is determined by the best-fitting

that generates the minimum deviance.

2.3. Model estimation
The PO(d) model is estimated via the full maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function
for platform i is denoted as

, and the likelihood for the whole sample is

, then its first derivative is

. Let
. The

likelihood function for a PO(d) is as follow:

And our econometric analysis is conducted via the following steps: First, choose the d.f. for
the PO model via the AIC and/or BIC values to identify the most appropriate proportionality
parameterization. Second, perform a backward elimination process and remove the least
significant variables. Third, apply a backward selection process to identify nonlinear
variables and choose the best fit FP transformation using closed-test algorithm. Fourth,
extend the model by including possible time-dependent effect. A forward selection process is
implemented using the 1% significance level. Fifth, plot the smoothed martingale residuals to
assess the goodness of fit. Finally, investigate covariate effects graphically.

3. Data
3.1. Data source
The social capital data are hand collected from the two most vibrant third-party professional
sites, WDZJ (www.wdzj.com) and P2Peye (www.p2peye.com), which serve investors and
platforms by providing free service such as investor community discussion forum, platform
data disclosure, platform directory, and industry statistics. Based on Alexa website traffic
ranking in China, these two websites are the top two most visited directory websites in online
P2P lending industry. The financial capital data come from three sources. WDZJ and P2Peye
disclose risk transfer and mitigation data based on information extracted from platforms’
official websites. Company registry information are collected from the government official
database, National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (www.gsxt.gov.cn).
5

Prefecture-level economic capital data are from the database of National Bureau of Statistics
of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/), and from city statistics bureau respectively. The
final data source is the official websites for platforms for supplement or for cross check.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Platform survival
Our study examines P2P platforms founded between June 2007, when the first P2P online
lending platform was established, and June 2017. Survival is defined if a P2P lending
platform’s website is still accessible, its contact numbers can be reached and its business is
normally and independently operating. Our definition for survival is consistent with the
literature on firm survival (Lyles et al., 2004); and the event indicator is 0 for these survived
platforms, and 1 for failed platforms. For platforms that are ongoing by the end of our sample
period, its lifespan is denoted as the difference between end of June 2017 and its entry date,
but the event indicator will be 0, so right censoring will occur in this case, but PO model can
deal with the issue. Besides, on condition that a platform was merged or acquired by another
company, depending on whether the new entity is still running in online P2P lending industry,
we categorize it differently: event indicator is 1 if the new entity is still running business in
online P2P lending industry, and 0 if the platform changes to another industry.
3.2.2. Social capital variables
To operationalize the concept of social capital, we propose two measures based on the
seminar work of Adler and Kwon (2002): online social network and online social reviews.
The online social network is essential for a platform to establish and generate social relations,
whereas online social reviews help strengthen the social relations (Gunilla & Mariam, 2004;
Wang et al., 2013). Online social network is measured as friends number (Wang et al., 2013;
Yang & Li, 2016) and online information sharing activity (Gunilla & Mariam, 2004). We use
subscriber number (Subscribers) as a proxy for friends number. Posts number (Posts) is used
to measure online information sharing activity. Both variables are scaled by platform age
considered that older platforms tend to have more subscribers other things being equal.
Online social reviews can be measured as detailed service quality ratings and online reviews
(Wang et al., 2013). Investors are able to share their investment experience by leaving
detailed service quality ratings (DSQR), which are categorized into four aspects of platform
service: cash withdrawal time, capital utility rate, customer service, and user experience.
Each category is graded from 1 to 5 with the highest score being the best. We use the average
of the four ratings (mDSQR) to capture this variable following Wang et al. (2013). The
variance of DSQR (vDSQR) is used for robustness checks. Investors are also able to put down
reviews for a particular platform and also attribute the reviews to one of three categories:
“Poor; do not recommend”, “Neutral”, and “Excellent; recommend”. Thus we derive the ratio
of negative/neutral/positive ratings by taking the percentage of negative/neutral/positive
ratings over the total number of ratings. We only include negative ratings (Neg_rating) for
two reasons. First, the literature has shown that good news is expected and neutral news is not
influential (Fiske, 1980). The other reason is to avoid potential multicollinearity. When using
percentage negative ratings, a zero percent can indicate either the platform is very good and
6

do not receive negative ratings, or no investors has rated the platform. To differentiate
between these two scenarios, we add a dummy variable (No_rating).
3.2.3. Financial capital variables
Financial capital is the financial resources available to a company. In the online P2P lending
platform context, we identify financial capital as the capital providing safety net, risk transfer,
risk mitigation and the prefecture-level economic support to a platform following the bank
failure literature (Betz et al., 2014; Calomiris & Mason, 2003). The registered capital
(Capital) is expected to serve as safety net and cover various costs since platforms usually
have heavy operational costs (Cubillas et al., 2017). For risk transfer, platforms usually seek
external guarantee such as insurance companies for sustainability improvement. We use a
dummy variable (Out_guaran) to indicate if a platform has outside guarantees and a variable
(Out_guaran_amt) to show log external guarantee amount. Another dummy (Loan_nego) for
risk transfer is to see whether a secondary market allowing investors to negotiate loans is
built. Risk mitigation measures can help relieve a platform’s financial distress. Two common
measures platforms take are to require borrower collateral against their borrowing
(Brrw_cllatrl) or to set up risk fund reserve (Riskfund). Platforms also try to mitigate investor
risk exposure by committing to pay back investors principal (Prin_guaran) or advancing
capital to investors if a loan turns bad (Advance). The GDP per capita (GDP_capita) is used
as a proxy for prefecture-level economic capital because people live in more well-off cities
are more likely to invest more and more tolerant to losses. Although P2P lending platforms
operate online, they are governed and supported by local regulatory authority.
3.2.4. Control variables
A number of control variables are included to avoid potential variable omission problem,
including dummies to indicate whether platforms provide hotline (Hotline), interactive
system (App) or transaction system (Autobid), and variables to illustrate self-disclosure level
(News) and firm size (Employees).
3.3. Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 shows platforms lifespan distribution in our sample. It is apparent that the industry is
dominated by young companies. Only around 2% of platforms last more than five years, and
only 0.2% of platforms survive more than eight years. Descriptive and correlation statistics
are available upon request. Most social capital and financial capital variables are
right-skewed, indicating that many platforms are underperformers in the industry, with some
very strong performers on the other end of the distribution. Correlation in most cases is
between -0.50 and 0.50 and not cause for collinearity concern.
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Figure 1: Histogram of platform distribution

4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Estimation results
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1 using the PO(3) model without considering
nonlinear transformation of variables or time-dependent effect. We prefer the PO(3) model
which combines low AIC/BIC value with model parsimony, and the problem of underfitting
or overfitting is avoided. Three main results are apparent. First, positive social relations
between platforms and their customers decreases the default probability and increases the
lifespan. Second, Model (2) shows that platforms benefit generally from their financial safety
net, risk transfer and mitigation measures, and prefecture-level economic development, but
the money back policy (Prin_guaran) puts platforms at a higher risk of failure. Third, when
both social and financial capital variables are included in Model (3), the significance of all
but two coefficients for financial capital variables are reduced and some of them become
insignificant; while the sign and significance of social capital variables remain.
Interestingly, the number of posts is positively related to a platform’s failure, which seems
counter-intuitive since more posts is usually interpreted as more social visibility and relations
(Wang et al., 2013). We run a text description analysis and extract the 30 most frequently
used words in online posts for platforms less than 2 years old, the sample mean lifespan, for
failed and surviving platforms separately. Results show that for the failed platforms the most
often used words are negative including fraud, rights problem and so forth whereas the
corresponding words for surviving platforms are more positive such as return, experience,
and security. Furthermore, more posts are published for failed platforms than surviving ones.
We believe that in this context the saying no news is good news is evidenced
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Subscribers
Posts
mDSQR
Neg_rating
No_rating
Capital
Loan_nego
Out_guaran
Out_guaran_amt
Brrw_cllatrl
Riskfund
Prin_guaran
Advance
GDP_capita
Basis0
Basis1
Basis2
Controls
Constant
N
LogL
RD2
C
D

(1)
Coefficient z-statistics
-1.568*** (-25.50)
1.731***
(26.80)
-0.014
(-0.59)
1.064***
(10.26)
1.121***
(14.12)

1.748***
-0.286***
-0.067***
NO
-1.278***
6190
-6658
0.518
0.782
0.564

(72.08)
(-18.55)
(-4.70)
(-17.31)

(2)
Coefficient z-statistics

-0.086***
-1.111***
-0.503***
-0.037***
-0.935***
-0.526***
0.450***
-0.022
-0.508***
1.355***
-0.209***
-0.086***
NO
7.115***
5859
-7551
0.147
0.653
0.307

(-5.87)
(-18.23)
(-9.28)
(-4.94)
(-6.14)
(-8.87)
(7.30)
(-0.36)
(-8.87)
(71.67)
(-15.66)
(-7.40)
(10.52)

(3)
Coefficient z-statistics
-1.207*** (-17.60)
1.813***
(26.25)
-0.057**
(-2.27)
0.884***
(8.08)
0.917***
(10.78)
0.0142
(0.82)
-0.357*** (-4.91)
-0.061
(-0.98)
-0.016**
(-2.15)
0.295*
(1.74)
-0.041
(-0.63)
0.811***
(10.83)
0.097
(1.46)
-0.238*** (-4.04)
1.812***
(70.09)
-0.303*** (-18.66)
-0.063*** (-4.15)
YES
2.356***
(3.30)
5842
-6029
0.559
0.796
0.591

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table 1. Parameter estimates for baseline PO(3) model
.
The long list of significant coefficients in the baseline results makes it difficult for investors,
policymakers and platform managers to clearly see the message. Hence we follow the model
estimation procedure outlined in Section 2.3 and undertake a prognostic test. Results are
summarized in Table 2. In Table 3, we include all significant variables from the prognostic
test. The results are consistent with our baseline models, further substantiating the stability
and robustness of our model. Model (5) is our ultimate model for P2P lending platform
survival. In addition, the smoothed martingale residuals of coefficient estimation see no
systematic departure from zero, indicating a good fit for Model (5).
Variables
Subscribers
Posts
mDSQR
Neg_rating
No_rating
Capital
Loan_nego
Out_guaran
Out_guaran_amt
Brrw_cllatrl
Riskfund
Prin_guaran
Advance
GDP_capita
Hotline
App
Autobid
News
Employees

Deviance difference,
closed-test procedure
FP(1) versus
FP(1) versus
null
linear
548.723***
0
1502.350***
272.745***
7.579*
0.478
57.347***
5.446**
131.183***
0
5.364
—
20.651***
0
1.531
—
4.682
—
4.846
—
0.042
—
99.616***
0
0.948
—
12.378***
0
32.197***
0
36.945***
0
0.142
—
81.899***
28.321***
58.695***
7.787***

FP
transformation
Powers or
exclusion
1
0.5
1
2
1
exclude
1
exclude
exclude
exclude
exclude
1
exclude
1
1
1
exclude
-2
-1

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Time-dependent
effect
Include or
d.f.
not
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
include
2
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
include
3
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
no
—
include
1

Table 2. Selection of influential variables, nonlinear transformation and time-dependent effect
FP Transformation
Subscribers
Posts*
mDSQR
Neg_rating*
No_rating
Loan_nego
Prin_guaran
GDP_capita
Hotline
App
News*
Employees*
Basis0
Basis1
Basis2
Basis_No_rating0
Basis_No_rating1
Basis_Prin_guaran0
Basis_Prin_guaran1
Basis_Prin_guaran2
Basis_Employees0
Constant
N
LogL
RD2
C
D

—
(Posts)0.5
—
(Neg_rating)2
—
—
—
—
—
—
(News)-2
(Employees)-1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(4)
Coefficient
-1.246***
2.925***
-0.069***
0.875***
0.958***
-0.330***
0.748***
-0.225***
-0.368***
-1.342***
5.56e-09***
0.055***
1.856***
-0.327***
-0.051***

0.170
5859
-5897
0.586
0.801
0.601

z-statistics
(-19.99)
(32.12)
(-2.74)
(7.87)
(11.52)
(-4.57)
(10.93)
(-3.88)
(-4.9)
(-5.08)
(9.22)
(8.02)
(72.12)
(-20.79)
(-3.35)

(0.25)

(5)
Coefficient
-1.282***
2.852***
-0.082***
1.032***
1.029***
-0.324***
0.614***
-0.218***
-0.323***
-1.317***
5.52e-09***
0.043***
2.124***
-0.124*
-0.088***
-0.337***
-0.144**
0.618***
-0.113
0.240***
-0.014***
0.003
5859
-5813
0.636
0.806
0.613

z-statistics
(-19.29)
(31.71)
(-3.07)
(8.65)
(11.52)
(-4.22)
(7.59)
(-3.76)
(-4.55)
(-4.99)
(8.95)
(6.32)
(26.12)
(-1.86)
(-5.23)
(-3.91)
(-2.01)
(6.19)
(-1.46)
(4.99)
(-2.79)
(0.00)

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table 3. Prognostic model with nonlinearity transformation and time-dependent effect
To summarize, the consistency in coefficient estimates across Model (1) to Model (5)
reinforces our key message on P2P lending platform survival: these online platforms still rely
on financial resources for their survival in a way similar to more traditional financial service
entities. However, operational entirely online has added an additional dimension to their core
characteristics thus making social capital a more essential driver for survival. In the online
context, when social capital is absent, financial capital offers valuable indication of platform
operation. However, when social capital is available, it provides more dynamic and detailed
information on customer population, ratings and feedback, hence proves more influential to
the decision-making of customers, leading to its more significant impact on platform survival.
These results enrich and advance our understanding of the determinants for the survival of
Chinese online P2P lending platforms.
4.2. Graphical analysis
Figure 2 illustrates the time-varying effect of a variable exerts on the hazard rate. The hazard
ratio is between the hazard rate of a variable plus one standard deviation and the hazard rate
of the variable itself. For dummy variables, the ratio is between the hazard rate of 1 and that
of zero. For social capital variables, subscriber number has a long run effect, whereas others
have comparatively short-term effect. For example, the effect of posts number is quite large at
=0 but drops swiftly and massively within two years. For financial capital variables,
prefecture-level economic capital exhibits a long-term effect whereas the other two exhibit
shorter-term effect. Money back policy (Prin_guaran) improves survivability at a very early
10

stage to around four months as it mitigates the platform’s liability of newness (Freeman et al.,
1983). However, the benefit gradually diminishes for the first few years of operation, but if
the platform can survive long enough, this negative effect subsequently fades away.

Figure 2. Effect of financial and social capital varaibles on hazard ratio, with 95% CI band
The economic intuition of social and financial capital variables indicates that in order to
enhance platform survival probability more efficiently, a platform can either increase its
social capital by obtaining more subscribers, having less negative posts, and soliciting better
investor rating, or increase its financial capacity by opening a secondary market, growing
independent from money back policy, and locating in economically better off cities.
4.3. Prediction analysis
The prognostic index (

) estimated via our model can illustrate the level of a platform’s

default risk and help predict its survival. Figure 3 plots platform survival time against the
prognostic index, with the 10th and the 90th percentile representing low and high default risk,
respectively. For firms with medium-level risk, the survival time for bottom and top 10th
suggests that 80% platforms with medium risk operate between 9 to 67 months before they
default. Information of this nature is very useful, especially to investors for making informed
investment decision, and to regulators for introducing relevant and directed policy.
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Figure 3. Survival time in 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles
4.4. Robustness check
To show that our results are not due to specific choice for variables or estimation method, we
conduct four robustness tests, including dividing the outsider guarantee variable (Out-guaran)
into four specific common types, using the variance of DSQR rather than the mean, applying
an extended Cox model (Cox, 1972), and using variables without FP transformation; we find
qualitatively similar results. Results are available upon request.

5. Conclusion
We assess the role of social capital variables and financial capital variables in determining
survival patterns of online P2P lending platforms via implementing a flexible proportional
odds model with a baseline spline function as well as considering potential nonlinearity and
time-dependent effect of variables. Our prognostic model captures 12 influential variables out
of 19 available variables, and it shows nice fit and robust prediction power. The model is
simple but powerful in providing reference to investors and policy makers in monitoring
platforms. It is flexible enough to accommodate new variable and data at higher frequency.
We also uncover a host of important findings. First, social capital is a key driver to platform
survival and is more significant than financial capital in economic terms. For investors and
policy makers, social capital is helpful for distinguishing high and low risk lending platforms.
Financial capital is important to platforms but registered capital can be misleading to
investors as it is not a significant indicator for platform survival. For platform managers, not
all social capital deserves their effort in the long run. We find that increasing subscriber
number and achieving better customer ratings are the key to survive longer. In addition,
opportunities of information exchange between platform and customers and between
customers themselves enhance survival probability. We also argue that gathering a large
number of posts at an early stage is not a good sign for survival as investors are more likely
to punish those platforms by posting negative comments and sharing poor experience.

i

The information is disclosed by the WDZJ database, which is introduced in Section 3.1.
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